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## The Refugee Camp as Warscape: Violent Cosmologies, “Rebelization,” and Humanitarian Governance in Kakuma, Kenya

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# The Refugee Camp as Warscape: Violent Cosmologies, “Rebelization,” and Humanitarian Governance in Kakuma, Kenya

## Introduction

Refugee camps and violence do not go well together, yet they are closely related. By intention, the camp is a place isolated from the violence of homeland wars. It is a separation: a controlled and politics-free space apart from both the homeland and the host country. This externalization is problematic. Instead of perceiving of violence as something exceptional to the camp, I argue that it should be understood as an essential aspect in its organization.

In this essay I approach the refugee camp as a warscape in which violence, in manifest but also symbolic or imminent forms, affects everyday life in the camp. The dynamics of past and present violence translate into forms of spatial and social ordering that are essential in the understanding of the development of the protracted refugee camp as a socioeconomic entity.

These ordering processes counter the image of protracted refugee camps as seclusion sites where depoliticization and marginalization deprive refugees from their identities as social actors. Instead, the notion of the warscape allows an understanding of the protracted refugee camp as something other than a humanitarian necessity and enables a more critical focus on social organization processes that occur across time.

Kakuma refugee camp is one of those large protracted camps. It is located in the semi-arid Turkana region in northwest Kenya, near the borders with Uganda, South Sudan, and Ethiopia. Since its inception in 1992, the camp has been inhabited by a majority of (south) Sudanese and Somali refugees, but also by a significant population from Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, and Uganda, as well as smaller groups from Rwanda, Burundi, and Eritrea. In 2000 nearly 90,000 refugees were registered in Kakuma. This figure declined after 2006 but rose again after 2010 with an influx of Somalis and South Sudanese; in 2014 the camp had 125,000 registered refugees.<sup>1</sup> In earlier studies I perceived of the camp as an accidental city, which over time developed into a social and spatial organization that became increasingly normal and embedded in the wider region.<sup>2</sup> This essay focuses on one aspect of this social organization. It is based on eighteen months of ethnographic fieldwork in Kakuma between 2004 and 2006, with further field visits in 2010 and 2012.

## The Camp as a Warscape

In December 2013 I was in Juba, the capital of South Sudan, when clashes broke out between rival factions in the military. South Sudan had gained its independence from

Sudan two and a half years earlier after decades of war. Although the country was severely underdeveloped and still faced several regional pockets of armed conflict, a return to war seemed far away. This illusion was shattered in a matter of days, when a civil war was reignited that has continued to the time of this writing.

Several men of the Dinka tribe, whom I had first met almost a decade earlier in Kakuma, I now regularly met again in Juba, after they had returned some years before. The men lived in a tented camp on the banks of a tributary to the river Nile, near the old center of the city. When the clashes erupted, they immediately organized around the violence. Through their social networks they managed to arrange for soldiers to guard their tented camp, which subsequently became a refuge for their peers who stayed elsewhere in Juba. Some others I met later in Nairobi, where they were organizing to protect themselves and their communities back in South Sudan. They reasoned along the lines of “We know how to use the gun, we were soldiers before,” referring back to their youth as proto-child soldiers in the refugee camps of Gambella in Ethiopia, and later as “Lost Boys” in Kakuma camp in Kenya.

For those young men, war was never far away. Life in the camp was to a large extent organized according to references and experiences with violence, and the camp itself was linked to the war in many ways. Then, many Sudanese viewed the camp as not only a refuge in a general sense but also a facility where future cadres for the war were groomed. Yet this perception was kept quiet in public.

After I reconnected with some of these former refugees in Juba after independence in 2011, some of them read parts of my dissertation on the camp as an accidental city. While we were discussing it with a small group, one of them remarked, “So you knew, we thought so.” He meant that they had then anticipated that I knew about the associations with the Sudanese rebels all along, but that they were not supposed to talk about this. They were sensitive to the problematic relation between the camp and the war. That relation was instrumental in understanding the camp as a warscape.

Kakuma camp was socially and spatially organized in “refugee communities”—a bureaucratic categorization based on nationality, which changed as the camp became inhabited and reorganized. The boundaries of these communities, and the ways they managed and positioned themselves vis-à-vis the refugee regime and other groups of refugees, were strongly related to wartime affiliations, often conflated with ethnic identities, as continuations of conflict from the past or emanating from the camp itself. Nordstrom borrows from Appadurai’s “ethnoscape”<sup>3</sup> to suggest that violence affects how “each person, each group brings a history that informs action and is negotiated vis-à-vis the various other histories of those with whom they interact.”<sup>4</sup> Violence is an essential element of the camp’s social ordering and the history thereof, as “a broad field of dynamics which is part of war time processes, but not necessarily confined to the front line.”<sup>5</sup> “Warscape” is a useful term in considering how violence shapes the landscape or the social and spatial ordering of Kakuma.

The perspective of the warscape bridges the physical, symbolic, and social understanding of violence that is part of the history and identity of refugee groups in general and the camp itself. My Dinka informant who remarked, while passing a Nuer in the camp, “Those Nuer have no minds, by the way,” referred to a history of past violence in multiple locales and on various occasions, not only in the camp but also in Sudan.

This represents what Ingo Schröder and Bettina Schmidt call “violent imaginaries,” as “the emphasizing of the historicity of present day confrontations,” rooted in the history and context of the relations in and around the camp.<sup>6</sup> Violence then manifests itself not only in the destruction of boundaries but in their creation.<sup>7</sup> As part of the relationship between “self and society,” violence maintains and shapes communities and affects the humanitarian bureaucratic organization of the camp.<sup>8</sup> It is a negotiation of space in which legitimacy and authority are contested.

Nordstrom writes that violence is “fraught with assumptions, presuppositions, and contradictions. Like power, violence is essentially contested: everyone knows it exists, but no one agrees on what actually constitutes the phenomenon.”<sup>9</sup> Similarly, for the violent imageries that refugees referred to in the form of personal histories, gossip, and rumor, it is not necessarily relevant whether these references were “true” or not; what is important is how these stories were used by people in explaining their lives and histories in the camp setting. That contentiousness that Nordstrom references, then, is the essence of the idea of the warscape. The rumors and stories about events are how groups perceive of, and relate to, each other, even though violence may not be (or not yet) manifest but symbolic or imminent.<sup>10</sup> In Kakuma, these war- and violence-related imageries were strongly linked to histories and politics of rebellion and the ways they shaped camp governance.

### **Refugee Camp Rebelization**

The origin of Kakuma camp starts with the arrival of the “Lost Boys,” as they became known to the larger public. In 1992, 12,000 children separated from their parents in the chaos of war showed up at the Sudanese-Kenyan border near Lokichigio, after they had been forced to leave several refugee camps in the Gambella region in Ethiopia.<sup>11</sup> A camp was prepared some 100 kilometers south, next to the village of Kakuma, in the Turkana region of northern Kenya. Here, villagers explained how hundreds of skinny, hungry, and barely dressed or naked children showed up sometime in May. The image of large groups of young children fleeing from conflict under extremely difficult circumstances, separated from their parents, and in dire need of help is the perfect example of the depoliticized *raison d’être* for humanitarian action. The Lost Boys constituted the hideous collateral of war. Yet there is something else about this story. A closer reading shows that the Lost Boys are emblematic for the association of the rebel movement with the refugee camp, from the very beginning, and before, in the camps in Ethiopia.

Rather than orphaned war victims, the Lost Boys represented the child soldiers of the South Sudanese rebel movement that made up the “Red Army”—the child soldiers from the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA). From the mid-1980s onward, young boys were brought from Sudan to the Gambella region in Ethiopia to be trained as future cadres for the war.<sup>12</sup> In some accounts, the SPLA demanded one child from every family, as they passed from village to village to collect them. It is not clear where intent and circumstance met. While war forced people to move, amid this movement people also became targets for recruitment in the rebel army, in addition to organized recruitment. Flight and recruitment went hand in hand. This is how a great number of people ended up in the Ethiopian camps.

This story resonated though Kakuma as collective history. In Gambella, the refugee camps Dimma, Itang, and Fugnido had been located nearby the rebel camps Bongo and Bilpam. The youngest children lived and attended school in the refugee camps and received basic military training, condoned by the Ethiopian government of Mengistu Haile Mariam.<sup>13</sup> When the children were old enough, some of them were sent to the rebel camps and from there back to Sudan to fight.<sup>14</sup>

After Mengistu's government fell in 1991, the SPLA was expelled from Gambella and the camps were evacuated with force. From here, some of the children made it to Kenya after a long trek across southern Sudan. While most accounts of the Lost Boys highlight how they came to Kenya in search of refuge as a desperate band of orphans, the accounts often ignore that they came together with the SPLA.

Other than in Ethiopia, there were no rebel camps in the vicinity of Kakuma, and the camp became linked to the war in a more indirect way. For instance, it was a place where the war-wounded could rehabilitate, after they had been treated in the Red Cross hospital near Lokichoggio. But it also served as a place where SPLA members sent their wives, children, and other dependents for safety and schooling, and where fighters came for R&R. The camp also provided a site where the Movement—as the SPLA was referred to—gained and maintained support and recruited but also protected its people. Many of the refugee camps that together harbored almost half a million Sudanese refugees in Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and the Central African Republic in fact served as SPLA rear bases in one way or another.<sup>15</sup>

Muggah and Mogire define refugee camp militarization as “the combination of military and armed attacks on refugees within camps; the storage and diffusion of weapons, military training and recruitment; the presence of armed elements, political activism, and criminal violence within camps; and the exploitative use of relief/development resources by non-refugee residents and their dependants.”<sup>16</sup> In Kakuma, the influence of the rebel movement was more nuanced. As the camp became protracted, new ambitions and opportunities arose. Although there were accounts of recruitment, and the hosting of irregular rebel fighters (for instance, a South Sudanese from Equatoria who would join a militia during his holidays from his refugee job with one of the NGOs), in general, as some of the elders would acknowledge, the camp's relation with the struggle shifted from education for the military to education for skills development.<sup>17</sup> Although many people were affiliated with the SPLA in one way or another, instead of an overt militarization of the refugee camp, it is more appropriate to talk about a “rebelization.” Life in the camp and the opportunities that arose there were associated with and influenced by the Movement's interests, aims, and attempts to regulate life in exile. Reciprocally, the ways refugees related to the Movement and its history of violence also influenced experience and opportunities.

### **Governance, Authority, and the Camp**

The Sudanese Dinka were most intimately linked to the rebel movement. This conflation resembles what Sarah Lischer refers to as “state-in-exile refugees,” a category that suits the Sudanese Dinka in exile as a group with a national claim and a strong leadership structure.<sup>18</sup> People allied to the Movement were simultaneously part of the refugee-hosting system.<sup>19</sup> These “refugee Big Men” held influential positions as

brokers and gatekeepers between the refugee regime and the refugees and held management jobs with the NGOs.<sup>20</sup> Children or adult kin of influential men from the SPLA were offered jobs in the Movement and affiliated institutions and traversed back and forth between Sudan, Kakuma, and Nairobi. Some of these people can be considered “refugee elites” and acted as brokers between the NGOs, the Sudanese self-settled refugees in Nairobi, and the leadership in Nairobi, the camp, and in Sudan.<sup>21</sup> I met people who migrated between different countries and maintained links between the Movement and the camp. One influential Sudanese refugee, for instance, had wives, children, and homes in three different refugee camps in Uganda and Kenya and migrated between them to liaise between the war, the Movement, and the camp. Another migrated between Nairobi, Kakuma, and Lokichoggio, to oversee and monitor the situation of the refugees.

In these roles they were able, from the very start of the camp’s existence, to influence the way the South Sudanese were positioned in Kakuma. Before NGOs started their educational programs, for instance, they organized the first schools, under the trees, just as they had done in Gambella. This led to a form of hybrid camp governance. Boege et al. define hybrid political orders as “diverse and competing authority structures, where sets of rules, logics of order, and claims to power co-exist, overlap, interact, and intertwine, combining elements of introduced Western models of governance and elements stemming from local indigenous traditions of governance and politics, with further influences exerted by the forces of globalization and associated social fragmentation (in various forms: ethnic, tribal, religious).”<sup>22</sup> In addition, I would add rebelization as a form of associated social fragmentation.

This hybrid political order can be recognized in the camp administrations, subdivided on the level of nationality and ethnicity, and the ways these were involved in the governing of the camp. The Sudanese maintained their own legal structures, with court sessions, jail facilities, and sentencing, including repatriation to Sudan for capital offences. With this, parallel legal orders emerged. For instance, one of my informants was sanctioned and fined by the Sudanese leadership because he reported a theft to the Kenyan police instead of going to his own refugee administration. Other communities claimed similar space to manage their own affairs removed from the refugee regime’s control. The Somalis had their own customary systems that dealt with domestic and social issues, and other groups had similar arrangements.

In the organization of the camp, refugee administrations were set up as a means of self-management but were simultaneously born out of the practical demands of governing a large group of people for a prolonged period of time. The result was an ambiguous space where the mandate of the refugee regime based on human and refugee rights, focusing on emancipation and empowerment, was shared with authority of the refugee communities themselves. In this space, sometimes overtly and sometimes covertly, refugees had considerable room to maneuver with issues such as domestic disputes.

These political subjectivities open up another perspective on conflict in the camp. Clashes between refugees and Kenyan nationals, and within and between refugee groups, led to the camp’s reputation as a violent place.<sup>23</sup> People told stories about intercommunal clashes over resources such as water, between different tribes, and

between national groups. These stories went hand in hand with ideas about the groups that were involved, their power and strength, their backgrounds and affiliations, and the imminent threat they could pose to intervene in affairs. Even those born in the camp were part of an organization of people bounded by histories of animosity and mistrust, and by the power constellations in which those histories were rooted.

Clashes between the Sudanese Dinka and the Nuer tribes in 1996, for instance, reflected (past) events in South Sudan. Similarly, clashes between the Equatorial tribes and the Dinka in 1998 were instigated by the killing of prominent leaders from both sides in the war. The 1994 split in the SPLA, in which a Nuer section seceded under the command of Riek Machar, was mirrored in the camp in clashes between the Dinka and the Nuer. As a result of these clashes, the Nuer became spatially separated from the Dinka, which was also the outcome of clashes between Equatorial tribes and the Dinka. The Nuer were concentrated in a specific area henceforth referred to as the “Equatorial community.” As such, the Dinka, Equatorial, and Nuer communities had been spatially reorganized to avoid each other’s water as much as possible.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Head of Sub-Office in Kakuma spoke of a problem of institutionalized violence, in which small problems could escalate to involve complete groups or communities, in some cases leading to fatalities. Some battles, like those mentioned above, resonated through the camp as foundational events. In this process, many people in the camp argued that it was the Sudanese who protected the refugees from attacks by the Kenyan Turkana. In the absence of effective Kenyan security measures, and with the threat of attacks by Kenyan Turkanas who had a history of animosity with the camp inhabitants, violence was condoned.

Wendy James describes how camp fights resulted in a sense of control and power among Uduk refugees in an Ethiopian camp.<sup>24</sup> I heard similar references to the history of camp clashes in Kakuma: “Man, we fought them with spears!” Years later, Sudanese youth would recall one of the main battles between the refugees and the Kenyan Turkana hosts armed with AK-47s. These narratives are not just about the fight itself but also about the boundaries that are protected or maintained and the space they create to grant refugees a sense of control. Resistance was frequently seen as dysfunctional and disturbing, but the clashes between different groups in the camp had significant impact in determining the spatial distribution of ethnicities, loyalties, resources, and vulnerabilities.

### **Refugee Warriors Light?**

During my fieldwork, I met many people who expressed linkages to opposition or armed groups in their country of origin in the past, sometimes openly and sometimes more covertly. Refugees know the political quagmire surrounding the politicization of the refugee camp and the necessity of preserving their image as victims.<sup>25</sup> As a result, political affiliations and links to rebel movements were not openly spoken about to outsiders. For many in the camp, such as the Ugandans and the Ethiopians, Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which allows for an exclusion of refugee protection when the applicant is guilty of war crimes or crimes against humanity, means membership of rebel movements, even in the past, is information kept close to the



vest. Even though active links with rebel movements may be something from the past for most, people still perceive these as relevant in the present. The following example may be telling.

More than a year into my fieldwork, one of my informers, whom I had known from the beginning, came to me and said that he had presented me with a fictitious identity. He wanted to explain the reasons, and in three long sessions he went into the how and why of this construction. As it turned out, he had come to the camp as a rebel. Although he was a Ugandan, he had allied with the SPLA after his Ugandan rebel army had been defeated. Like many of his compatriots, he crossed the border into South Sudan and teamed up with the southern rebels. He explained that to get access to the camp without being branded a rebel, he had adopted another ethnicity, name, family, flight history, and so on. But now, as was true for many in those days, he wanted to apply for third-country resettlement to the United States, which meant that he was reconsidering his earlier registration. He wondered whether it would be possible to come clean about his past and reclaim his identity. I suspect that would have been problematic, for he would be labeled a fraud, or a refugee warrior, and if so it would illustrate the necessity of separating violence from the camp.

His confession indicated two main methodological problems. The first: how to validate all these references to war and armed movements? Both refugees and humanitarian workers claimed that most of the men in the camp had a rebel or military background, and gradually more and more examples supported this claim. For instance, the early arrivals in the Ethiopian community were to a large extent former military of the Mengistu era (the very same that were defeated after which the SPLA was expelled from Gabella); the Rwandan community, almost exclusively Hutu, was understood to consist of *génocidaires* of the 1994 genocide; Ugandan Nilotics from the north were associated with the remnants of the Ugandan Peoples Democratic Army (UPDA) and later the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). There were former Somali military of the Siad Barre regime, and the various Francophone groups were subject to a mix of accusations, rumors, and gossip alleging backgrounds in various rebel factions from the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and elsewhere.

Many of these associations and stories were anecdotal and hard to verify, and as such they could not be considered empirical data. On the other hand, the camp was full of people who had similar histories. While it was possible for me to discuss those experiences with some refugees, it depended on the rapport and field relations I had developed with them as part of the ethnographic endeavor. Many of these men, former rebels from different ethnic and national backgrounds, also knew each other. They were able to map out the camp in considerable detail, noting where different factions resided, what their roles had been in the past, and in some cases how this related to their position in the camp in the present. As for the man who created a fictitious identity, he had been in the camp since 1993, had a job as a teacher, and knew the camp and its workings intimately.

The second methodological problem: how to understand the less direct past or symbolic affiliations with armed movements in the context of the camp? There were those groups in the camp that came straight out of a rebel army, but over time their affiliations became hazy. Zolberg et al. refer to refugees with an active link to rebel or

military movements as “refugee warriors” and assert that refugee warrior communities of the 1980s (such as the Afghans in camps in Pakistan) were the “new Palestinians,” in the sense that neither could go home, and both formed part of a rebel movement (in exile).<sup>26</sup> In Kakuma, many people affiliated to armed movements in the past felt, or claimed, that they were unable to go home, fearing arrest or worse. But in time, linkages to rebel movements and aims changed, and intentions to regroup or engage did not materialize, perhaps as a result of social transformations due to camp life and losing touch with the political developments at home. The label “refugee warrior” is perhaps too strict to apply to Kakuma in a general sense, even though some people or groups would qualify or would have qualified in the past. Yet associations with violence, the conflicts people had participated in, still affected their lives in the camp, and therefore the camp itself.

### **Humanitarianism, Rebelization, and the Ambiguity of Hybrid Governance**

The prospect of aiding people with a military or rebel background is uncomfortable for the refugee regime. It is in the UNHCR’s and NGOs’ interest to keep up the appearance of the population of the camp as victims and innocent refugees, instead of possible (past) perpetrators of violence, to preserve the civilian image of the camp. The events in the Rwandan camps after 1994, where the genocide against moderate Hutus continued and its architects were sheltered as refugees, is a dark episode in the history of modern refugee protection.<sup>27</sup>

The presence of refugee warrior communities transforms humanitarian space into political space, precisely because refugee warriors have attained political subjectivities.<sup>28</sup> The refugee camp, as a temporary solution for people in need, is ideally a space where the violence of home, or the politics that lead to that violence, is not present. This is why politics in the camp are problematic, that is, politics outside of the space of the refugee regime itself. In this perspective, refugee camps can be related to the state of exception, with refugees as people without politics, legitimized by the camp as a temporary measure to protect them from the violence of war.<sup>29</sup>

Any reference to violence in this context becomes an aberration to be overcome and is understood as deriving from practical circumstances such as deprivation, frustration, criminality, and irrational behavior due to traumas of war. This is what Schröder and Schmidt refer to as an “operational approach” to violence, a frame also held by the refugee regime, whose prime mandate is the management of a population in a depoliticized context.<sup>30</sup> In the camp, violence is depoliticized as criminal or irrational behavior, or as a dangerous continuation of war and refugee camp militarization. These are externalizations of violence, as exceptions to what a camp should be.

This depoliticization and exceptionalization of violence presents an uneasy ambiguity. The militarization of refugee camps is typically approached by “a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ policy, that allows militarization to continue as long as it does not occur under the noses of the aid workers.”<sup>31</sup> In UNHCR’s 2005 Annual Protection Report for Kenya, for instance, refugee recruitment by SPLA was reported as nonexistent in Kakuma, even though it was obvious that it happened, as observed by refugees and staff.<sup>32</sup> Several reasons can be given for this “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy.

First, perhaps it is not so much of an issue for those most intimately involved in camp management. For instance, the heads of security for UNHCR and one of the main NGOs in the camp, both national staff, were former army men and were therefore likely to have a different idea about the linkages between refugees and armed movements than what is sustained in mainstream humanitarian discourse. A former Kenyan army colonel, who became a security researcher with an NGO in Nairobi, for instance, viewed refugees as people who had enjoyed certain privileges under regimes whose exit from power deprived them of these. He recognized refugees in Kenya as “professionals, politicians, military, police, and intelligence officers, and so forth, who get disadvantaged by the change of regime.”<sup>33</sup> Moreover, national aid workers, other than international staff that are on relatively short missions, can become intimately involved with refugees and their causes. Some UNHCR staff who started in 1992 still worked in Kakuma in 2010. These people had knowledge about particular refugees, their social organization, and specifically the ambiguities characteristic of life in the protracted refugee camp. This level of familiarity with the camp would explain the “matter of fact” way humanitarian staff viewed the rebel backgrounds and associations of refugee groups.

Second, there was certain sympathy with some causes of refugee groups in the camp, especially with regard to the South Sudanese. Humanitarian aid, as Lischer argues, can sustain a war economy and legitimize warring parties, their objectives, and rationales.<sup>34</sup> Some argued that the cooperation with the southern rebels in Operation Lifeline Sudan, largely operating from Lokichoggio, less than a hundred kilometers north of Kakuma, legitimized rebels’ struggle.<sup>35</sup> In a more general sense, the narrative of the plight of the Southern Sudanese against their Arab oppressors, although an obvious simplification of events, meant that they fought a just war in the eyes of many donors. The Sudanese cause has been framed as a just one, such that even the forced recruitment of the Red Army, or the conflation of refugee aid and military strategies as in the Gambella region, were condoned.

Third, the projection of the camp as a politics-free space in which violence is exceptional is problematic. Alex De Waal refers to humanitarian action as something beyond politics, as a “necessary fiction, that as emergencies become prolonged, is a pretence that becomes harder to uphold.”<sup>36</sup> Not only did the association between rebel actors and refugees lead to a politicization from the onset of the camp’s existence; the refugee regime’s policy of empowerment and participation in camp management allows for, or has condoned, the creation of pockets of authority that are rooted in the politics of war. Others have noted the pitfalls of self-governance as potentially counter-productive to humanitarian aims, for instance by reinstating “elder enclaves of supposedly autocratic power” or in other ways strengthening existing or enabling new power structures.<sup>37</sup> Two directors of important offices with the NGOs, for instance, were both regarded as SPLA men, who had come with the “Lost Boys” when Kakuma opened. As one of them confided during an interview, they were tasked to guard over the youth and bring them to another place after they had been expelled from Ethiopia. After the peace agreement was signed, these men were rewarded with government positions in the transition government of what would become South Sudan. They held influential positions in the camp, which highlights the association between the

camp as a site of refuge and the camp as a site under rebel influence. In this way, people with rebel backgrounds and memberships became teachers, health workers, and members of community-governing bodies.

This influence is problematic in cases where people are manipulated and misinformed for political reasons, in terms of both the everyday running of the camp and camp relations and recruitment and repatriation. For instance, when the peace was signed in Sudan, leaders wanted to prevent a rushed repatriation. Rumors suggested that SPLA wanted the camp to remain open, while UNHCR wanted people to return, and it was believed that without the Sudanese the camp would close. A UNHCR staff member explained to me during those days that “SPLA cronies” involved in the preparation for a pending repatriation were not speaking for the benefit of the people but for the Movement.

The ambiguities resulting from the meeting of humanitarian governance and refugee governance become clear in circumstances regarded as customary for the south Sudanese but which are serious protection concerns with regard to refugee and human rights: these include sexual and gender-based violence, forced marriage, abduction, bench court rulings, and incarceration, among more mundane issues such as theft or conflict. To some degree, the claim to self-governance was related, or put forward, with the reference to, or threat of, violence.

The hybrid governance in the warscape of Kakuma can be seen as a negotiation between the refugee regime that seeks to dissociate refugees from violence in the past and in the camp, and refugee leaders who seek space to manage and organize themselves, partly by referring to those violent pasts or re-enacting them in the present. These negotiations can take on the form of a threat. “Resettlement or the gun,” said a group of Ugandans, in their letters to the UNHCR and NGOs. Their idea was that if there were no durable solution in either third country resettlement or local integration in Kenya, they would organize and fight.

Ultimately it is questionable to what extent humanitarian governance can stop the influence of rebel actors on camps, and what form of benevolent dictatorship would be necessary to do so (Guglielmo Verdirame and Barbara Harrell-Bond refer to a “Janus-faced humanitarianism” when they discuss the duality of the protecting and also restraining refugee rights, given the practical demands of the camp).<sup>38</sup> In Kakuma, rebelization was condoned and tolerated where it did not lead to all-out violence and excessive repression. In comparison, in the case of the Rwandan camps in Goma it is debatable whether the refugee regime could have stopped camp militarization at all. Ultimately, the Rwandan government, and not UNHCR or the NGOs closed the camp (just as the Ethiopian government had closed the Sudanese camps).

Instead of seeking to portray camps as politics-free humanitarian spaces where violence does not obtain, the references and linkages to violence should be construed in the realm of social action and recognized as a part of the camp’s organization and processes of settlement and habitation. Violence in this sense is not dysfunctional but productive in the social and spatial organization of the camp. It may even make possible the regaining of political subjectivities and the reorganization of social order—though possibly an order other than the one to which humanitarians would subscribe.

## Conclusion

I have approached the camp as a warscape and argued that understandings of violence impact camp organization in a multitude of ways. In the history of this large camp, identities of individuals and groups were shaped by the narratives, experiences, and understandings of violence and rebel histories; these influenced where people lived in the camp, how authorities were formed and maintained, and who gained access to specific protective measures. These narratives, experiences, and understandings of violence were part of how Kakuma worked and part of ongoing ordering processes whereby people made sense of their own and others' place in the camp.

In this perspective, refugee camp rebelization is not so much about manifest violence as about social ordering and claiming space for refugee self-management. For different groups in the camp, violence and various references to it maintained or shaped authority. This, in turn, affected the governance of these communities, giving rise to ambiguities in refugee governance where the aims and intentions of UNHCR and the NGOs are met with the counter ordering or refugees themselves. Rather than viewing this as dysfunctional, disturbing, and exceptional, we should recognize it as something essential, and perhaps unavoidable, in the development of protracted refugee camps.

## NOTES

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1. "2015 UNHCR Country Operations Profile, Kenya," *UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency*, accessed February 2, 2015, <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483a16.html>.
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5. Danny Hoffman, "West-African Warscapes: Violent Events as Narrative Blocs: The Disarmament at Bo, Sierra Leone," *Anthropological Quarterly* 78, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 328–53, 350.
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9. Nordstrom, *A Different Kind of War Story*, 6.
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